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a b  s  t  r  a c  t 
People must often engage in sequential sampling in order to make predictions about the 
relative quantities of two options. We investigated how directional motives influence 
sampling selections and resulting predictions in such cases. We used a paradigm in which 
participants had limited time to sample items and make predictions about which side of 
the screen contained more of a critical item. Sampling selections were biased by 
monetary desirability manipulations, and participants exhibited a desirability bias for 
both dichotmous and continuous predictions. 
. 
1. Introduction
People often make predictions about relative quantities. 
Information seeking can be a key step in the process. For 
example, to predict whether there is a higher proportion 
of gothic-style buildings at Princeton or Washington 
University, a person might sample internet pictures of 
buildings from both universities. There are a variety of 
biases—both cognitive and motivated—that can influence 
how people sample information for such predictions (for 
reviews, see Crocker, 1981; Fiedler, 2000; Klayman & Ha, 
1987; Trope & Liberman, 1993). The present work concerns 
the potential role of a particular motivated bias tied to out- 
come desirability. In the context of our example, outcome 
desirability might refer to a desire that the proportion of 
gothic buildings is actually higher at Princeton. 
Research in social psychology suggests that when 
information is  threatening or  reflects negatively on  the 
self, 
people often avoid that information and/or seek more 
positive information (Festinger,  1957;  Frey,  1986;  
Hart et al., 2009; Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987). However, in inference tasks for which 
available information is not directly self-relevant, it is 
unclear whether people would sample information in a 
manner biased by outcome desirability, and whether 
such a bias would then influence optimism (see Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007). In the present studies, we used a 
paradigm in which people made predictions about relative 
quantities after sampling information. The outcomes and 
to-be-sampled information were entirely novel and not 
substantially self-relevant to participants. However, we 
used monetary manipulations to make the outcomes—
about which participants were making predictions—either 
desirable or undesirable. 
The specific task faced by our participants involved 
virtual tiles (see Fig. 1). When sampling, participants saw 
30 tiles on the left of their screen and 30 on the right. 
The top sides of all the tiles were identical, but for 12 s 
participants could turn over individual tiles to see whether 
their undersides displayed a particular target image. 
Then participants predicted whether, across all 60 tiles, 
there were 
Fig. 1. Black and white screenshot of the information sampling stage of the study. 
more of these targets on the left or right. Critically, before 
the sampling started, we manipulated whether a partici- 
pant would hope that more targets were on the left (or 
right). On some rounds, participants knew they would gain 
money if there were more targets on the left than right 
(otherwise they would gain nothing). We also had loss 
rounds where, for example, participants knew they would 
lose money if there were more targets on the left than right 
(otherwise they would lose nothing). Another important 
feature was that all participants had a strong monetary 
incentive—separate from the desirability manipulations— 
to form accurate predictions. 
There were several plausible hypotheses on how our 
normatively irrelevant manipulations of outcome 
desirability would influence information sampling and 
predictions. Our leading hypothesis was that participants 
would exhibit a desirability bias (or wishful thinking) 
both in their sampling patterns and predictions (e.g., 
Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Lench, 2009). That is, they 
would sample in places where they hoped large 
numbers of targets to be—rather than sample evenly 
between the left and right locations. This hope should not 
be a reason to search more on one side than another, 
given what participants knew about how the 
distribution of tiles was determined (see details in 
Section 2.1). By sampling more on the desired side, they 
would tend to find more targets on that side even 
though the proportion of targets-to-not-targets found 
would be the same (on average) for the two sides. Having 
seen more targets on the desired side, they would then 
tend to be overoptimistic. In other words, they would tend 
to predict that, among all 60 tiles, there were more targets 
on the desired side of the screen. 
Regarding alternative hypotheses, one might expect 
that participants would be realistic and unbiased—
especially because we used a strong accuracy incentive 
and be- cause participants assumed that accuracy feedback 
was impending rather than far into the future (see Carroll, 
Swe- 
eny, & Shepperd, 2006 for a review). Another alternative 
hypothesis anticipates a more pessimistic pattern. It is in- 
spired by work on the negativity bias (for reviews see Bau- 
meister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001) and suggests that people might sample 
more on the undesired side, perhaps as a way of bracing 
or ensuring that one isn’t surprised by bad news (e.g., Swe- 
eny & Shepperd, 2010). Critically, we included loss rounds 
so that we could distinguish our desirability hypothesis 
from yet another alternative hypothesis inspired by Vosge-
rau’s (2010) recent work on the stakes-likelihood 
hypothesis. Namely, perhaps participants would sample 
more from a high-stakes side rather than a side worth 
$0— regardless of whether the stakes are positive (e.g., 
potential to gain $5) or negative (e.g., potential to lose $5). 
Our desir- ability hypothesis and this stakes hypothesis 
predict the same results for gain rounds, but differing 
results for loss rounds—with the stakes hypothesis 
predicting that people would sample more from the 
undesirable side (e.g., lose 
$5) than the neutral side ($0). 
2. Experiment 1
 
2.1. Method 
 
Initial instructions introduced the undergraduate 
participants (N = 34) to the tile prediction task, the 
sampling process, and the potential monetary outcomes 
that would be used during the rounds. An accuracy 
incentive was also introduced. Namely, participants were 
told that, at the end of the experiment,  they would be 
asked to predict how much money they had earned or lost 
overall.1 If they were accurate, they would receive a $5 
bonus. 
 
1 
Awarded earnings/losses for each round were based on whether a 
participants’ predicted side was also the side for which the % of targets 
among viewed tiles was higher. 
There were four rounds. Prior to each round, one of five 
images (e.g., an orange) was arbitrarily selected by the 
participant as the target image for the upcoming round. 
Then the participant saw 60 tiles with identical topsides. 
From the initial instructions, participants were told that 
a random but unknown number of tiles (between 0 and 60) 
would contain the target image, while the rest of the tiles 
would contain other images. The participant clicked a but- 
ton to initiate random shuffling of tiles to the left and right, 
so that each side contained 30 tiles (see Fig. 1). Then 
participants were informed that they would win (lose) 
$5 if there were more targets on one side of the screen, 
and that they would win (lose) $0 if there were more 
targets on the other side of the screen. The order of the 
gain and loss rounds and the side of the screen that was 
made desirable were counterbalanced. Participants were 
instructed that if their final earnings were below $0, they 
would not have to pay the researchers; they would 
simply leave  the study with $0. 
After the tiles had been shuffled, participants had 12 s 
to sample—i.e., view images. Participants viewed the image 
on the underside of a tile by clicking on the tile. Once a new 
tile was clicked, the previously selected tile was turned 
back over, allowing for  sequential  viewing  only.  After 
12 s, participants were asked to predict which side of the 
screen actually contained more tiles with target images. 
Feedback was not provided during the rounds. After all 
rounds, participants were asked to estimate their overall 
earnings. Participants were then paid—with a minimum 
payout of $3. 
It is important to note that although participants were 
informed that between 0 to 60 of the tiles would contain 
the target image, the true number of targets per side was 
kept constant. Namely, each side of the screen contained 
18 targets (out of 30 tiles). We chose our instructions care- 
fully, so that it would be clear to participants that they 
would be unable to infer the number of targets on the 
opposite side of the screen based on their observations 
from one side of the screen or from their experiences in 
previous rounds. Therefore, the optimal strategy for pre- 
dicting which side of the screen contained more targets 
would involve sampling equally from the two sides of the 
screen. 
2.2. Results and discussion 
The counterbalance factors had no reliable effects, so 
the results we report are collapsed across those factors. 
Participants clicked an average of 24.4 tiles (SD = 4.2) per 
round. Biases in information selection (i.e., sampling) were 
calculated by dividing the number of clicks on the 
desirable side of the screen (gain $5 side for the gain 
rounds; lose $0 side for the loss rounds) by the total 
number of clicks. Values greater than 50% indicate a 
bias towards the desirable side. Rather than revealing 
unbiased selections or a pattern consistent with 
pessimism/vigilance/ bracing, the results were 
consistent with the desirability hypothesis. Namely, 
participants demonstrated a significant selection bias, 
with 53.9% (SD = 7.7%) of their clicks being on the 
desirable side of the screen, t(33) = 2.97, p < .01. The 
magnitude of the bias was not significantly 
different between the gain (M = 54.4, SD = 10.9) and loss 
rounds (M = 53.4, SD = 10.6), t(33) = 0.38, p = .71. That is, 
the tendency to pick the desirable side was about as strong 
when the side was attractive because it involved a gain of 
$5 as when it was desirable because it was the side that 
avoided losing $5. This latter result is consistent with the 
desirability hypothesis rather than the stakes hypothesis, 
which would predict that on loss rounds,  people  would 
tend to oversample from the lose $5 side (i.e., the undesir- 
able side). 
Participants’ predictions (regarding which side had 
more targets) revealed a related pattern. Participants 
predicted the desirable side 65.4% of the time (SD = 
20.4%), which is significantly greater than 50% and 
therefore reflects a desirability bias, t(33) = 4.41, p < .001. 
The tendency to predict the desirable side did not 
significantly differ between the gain (M = 70.6, SD = 30.4) 
and loss rounds (M = 60.3, SD = 36.5), t(33) = 1.13, p = .27. 
This pat- 
tern of results for predictions, like the pattern for 
information sampling, supports the desirability hypothesis 
and not the stakes hypothesis (nor a pessimism 
hypothesis). 
Additionally, selection biases and predictions were cor- 
related for the gain (r = .34, p < .05) and loss rounds (r = .38, 
p < .05). In other words, greater desirability biases in 
sampling were associated with more optimistic 
predictions. Note it is not inevitable that sampling biases 
favoring the desirable side would lead to optimistic 
predictions. Participants could sample more from one side, 
but then mentally compute a targets-to-total-clicked-tiles 
ratio for each side. By comparing those ratios, 
participants’ resulting predictions would be unbiased 
(but could be quite noisy). The fact that participants 
were overly optimistic in their pre- dictions and that this 
tendency was related to the selection biases suggests that 
participants were at least partially influenced by the 
absolute frequency of the targets seen on one side 
versus another (see Estes, 1976). 
Finally, participants were also overoptimistic in their 
predictions about their final earnings. While their 
prediction should have averaged around $0, the 
average predicted earnings  was  $5.74  (SD = $5.10), 
t(33) = 6.56, p < .001. 
3. Follow-up to Experiment 1
In response to a reviewer’s concern about whether 
participants would believe that losses are plausible (given 
that they started with $0), we conducted a new version of 
Experiment 1 but endowed participants (N = 47) with $6 
at the beginning of the study and included two rather than 
four rounds. We also tested a simplified accuracy incentive 
in which participants were informed that they would 
receive $1 for each correct prediction in each round. 
The results supported the same conclusions as dis- 
cussed for Experiment 1. Participants again sampled more 
from the desirable side of the screen (M = 55.0, SD = 12.2), 
t(46) = 2.78, p = .008. This selection bias did not 
significantly differ between the gain (M = 56.8, SD = 
17.4) and loss rounds (M = 53.1, SD = 16.7), t(46)=1.06, 
p=.30. Participants also again exhibited a significant 
desirability bias in their predictions (M = 64.9,  SD = 31.1),  
t(46) = 3.30, 
p = .002. Unlike Experiment 1, the predictions for the gain 
(M = 76.6, SD = 42.8) and loss (M = 53.2, SD = 50.4) rounds 
were significantly different, t(46) = 2.30, p = .03, but both 
means were again in a direction consistent with the 
desirability hypothesis. The selection biases and 
predictions were marginally correlated for the gain 
round (r = .25, p < .09) and significantly correlated for 
the loss round (r = .49, p = .001). Finally, when giving 
total estimates regarding how much they would 
gain/lose from the out- comes of the two rounds, which 
on average should be $0, participants’ average estimates 
were overoptimistic ($3.85; SD = $3.56), t(46) = 7.42, p < 
.001. 
4. Experiment 2
Experiment 1 and its follow-up revealed that, when 
participants had to make a dichotomous  prediction (left 
or right), both sampling and predictions were influenced 
by desirability. Previous research, which did not involve 
sampling processes, has revealed that although desirability 
biases can be detected when people are asked to make 
dichotomous predictions, the biases often vanish for 
likelihood judgments or more continuous predictions (see 
Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010; also see Dai, Wer- 
tenbroch, & Brendl, 2008 for a reversal). Because 
information sampling is possible and can be biased in the 
current paradigm (i.e., participants are not merely given 
a fixed set of information), we expected to find 
desirability biases even when continuous scales are used to 
solicit predictions. This was tested in Experiment 2. 
Finding a desirability bias on continuous scales of 
likelihood or of prediction confidence is something that 
has been considered ‘‘elu- sive’’ in the wishful thinking 
literature (Bar-Hillel & Bude- scu, 1995; see also Krizan 
& Windschitl, 2007). We also made minor changes to 
further test the generalizability of the Experiment 1 
results. Namely, we varied the number of targets across 
rounds and added variety to the dollar amounts used. 
4.1. Method 
The method was similar to that for Experiment 1, 
except as follows. Besides counterbalancing, the design 
was a 2 (gain or loss rounds) x 3 (6, 18,  or  24  targets 
per side) x 2 (dichotomous or continuous prediction) 
mixed- factor design. Each participant (N = 87) 
completed six rounds. Instead of always presenting $5 as 
the amount to be gained or lost during the gain and loss 
rounds, values of $3, $4, or $5 were used. As expected, 
this small variety in dollar amounts did not impact 
results and will not be discussed further. The gain-loss 
factor was crossed by whether there were 6, 18, or 24 
targets per side, out of 30 tiles per side. (As in 
Experiment 1, participants were told that the total 
numbers of targets was randomly deter- mined between 0 
and 60.) Some participants were asked to make a 
dichotomous prediction in each round, as in Experiment 1. 
Others were asked to indicate their prediction/ 
confidence on a continuous, visual-analog scale with the 
anchors of Definitely more of the target  image  on  the  left 
and Definitely  more  of  the  target  image  on  the  right. 
4.2. Results and discussion 
The overall results were similar to those from 
Experiment 1. On average, participants clicked  25.7 
tiles (SD = 4.5). Participants again exhibited a significant 
selection  bias  favoring  the  desirable   side   (M = 
53.3%, SD = 10.5), t(86) = 2.88, p < .01. This bias did not 
significantly differ as a function of the counterbalancing 
factors (ps > .09), nor as a function of the number-of-
targets or prediction-type factors (ps = .22). The bias also 
did not significantly differ between the gain (M = 54.0, SD 
= 12.4) and loss rounds (M = 52.5, SD = 11.9), t(86) = 1.21, 
p = .23. 
The predictions also revealed desirability biases. 
Participants making dichotomous predictions indicated the 
desirable side more than 50% of the time (specifically 
56.5%; SD = 17.0), t(45) = 2.60, p < .05. For participants 
using a continuous scale, we coded responses such that 
100 (0) would reflect maximal certainty that there were 
more targets on the desirable (undesirable) side of the 
screen.  The average  of   these   responses   (M = 55.3; SD 
= 15.0) was significantly greater than 50, which also 
reveals a desirability bias, t(40) = 2.27, p < .05. These 
desirability biases in predictions were not meaningfully 
qualified by the other main factors in the design.2 
Consistent with Experiment 1, the more biased 
participants were in their information search the more 
likely they were to predict that the desirable side had 
more targets. This was true for dichotomous (gain: r = .50, 
p < .001; loss: r = .30, p < .05) and continuous (gain: r = 
.35, p < .01; loss: r = .42, p < .01) predictions. 
Finally, participants were again overoptimistic in their 
final earnings predictions. When estimating their final 
earnings, their estimate also included a filler round (not 
mentioned above) that had an average payout of -$2 so 
their overall estimate should have averaged around -$2. 
However, it was significantly higher than that (M = $4.25, 
SD = $4.65), t(86) = 12.53, p < .001. 
5. General discussion
There were four theoretically plausible data patterns for 
how outcome desirability would influence information 
sampling and predictions in our studies. One possibility 
was that participants would be unbiased and realistic 
given the possibility for an accuracy bonus and that 
accuracy feedback was impending rather than distant 
(see Carroll et al., 2006). A second possibility was that, 
because of a negativity bias or bracing for bad news, 
participants would be inclined to check on pessimistic 
news by examining the undesired side (e.g., Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010). A third 
possibility was that participants would tend to seek 
information about outcomes with high- er stakes, even 
when those stakes involve losses (Vosgerau, 2010). The 
observed results, however, supported the desirability 
hypothesis. Participants were modestly but reliably biased 
toward seeking information on the desirable side and 
were biased in an optimistic direction regarding their 
2  
There  was  a  three-  and  four-way  interaction  that  could  not  be 
meaningfully interpreted. Otherwise, all ps > .19 
outcome predictions. The results are corroborated by re- 
cent (unpublished) findings from our lab showing the 
influence of outcome desirability on information seeking 
in a different type of paradigm (see Windschitl, Scherer, 
Smith, & Rose, 2012). Importantly, we have demonstrated  
that the influences of motivated biases in information 
sampling are not restricted to cases in which the 
information substantially reflects on the self (such as 
attitude-challenging information or threatening health 
information). Furthermore, our desirability manipulations 
were aimed at entirely novel outcomes, precluding the 
role of confounds that can accompany some desirability 
manipulations, such as a priori expectations (for discussion 
see Krizan & Winds-  chitl, 2007). 
The desirability biases observed here are clearly related 
to, but distinct from, positive test and focalism biases (Fox 
& Levav, 2000; Klayman & Ha, 1987; McKenzie, 1998; 
Windschitl, 2000). These latter biases are nonmotivated. 
They refer to how people seek and consider information 
about a focal hypothesis (or outcome)—regardless of the 
desirability of that hypothesis. In our work, we did not 
designate a focal outcome. It is possible, however, that 
the desirability of an outcome causes people to essentially 
adopt an outcome as focal, at which point positive test 
strategies and focalism have their influence. If so, our work 
can be thought of as showing that people adopt desirable 
outcomes, rather than undesirable ones or higher-stakes 
ones, as focal. Additional research should be aimed at the 
nexus of directional motivated biases and non-motivated 
processes to arrive at a more comprehensive view of how 
people sample information for making various predictions 
in everyday contexts. 
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